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This study aims to separately investigate: 1.The political reasons behind 
Norway‟s controversial decision to encourage a coal enterprise on Svalbard (an 
archipelago in the Arctic) and, 2.The current and future potential of wind and solar 
energy as untapped renewable sources, locally exploited through a hybrid wind-PV 
system.  In doing so this preliminary study attempts to provide insights for the 
implementation of an alternative, sustainable strategy to keep a Norwegian year-
round settlement at Longyearbyen, Svalbard, without any recourse to polluting 
mining operations. Such an eventuality, despite the need for further research, is 
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As a country with well-established traditions in environmental and climate 
research, it is highly surprising to learn about the controversial choice of Norway to 
encourage a coal industry on Svalbard, the vastest and northernmost wild area in 
Western Europe (Barr 1987). 
Despite recent warnings launched by scientists on the increasing emission of 
dangerous pollutants in the extraction process of coal and in the production of 
energy (KLIF 2009), there is still an opposition to a full climate protection policy, an 
attitude that is threatening the vulnerable, local ecosystem. This circumstance seems 
strictly related to the interpretation of the Treaty of Spitsbergen (1920), which 
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formally assigns the sovereignty of the archipelago to Norway, but even so, leaves a 
few „open doors‟ to other claimant countries, in particular Russia (Brown 2000).  
Politicians, on one hand, claim the key-importance of coal to a permanent 
Norwegian presence on the group of islands, mandatory for maintaining their 
political control. In the following debate, however, I argue the existence of an 
alternative, sustainable strategy to keep a year-round settlement as Longyearbyen 
alive, which I believe can be achieved without any recourse to polluting mining 
operations. 
From a methodological point of view, I will mainly draw on quantitative 
information, in particular on the emission data issued in 2009 by KLIF (Norwegian 
Climate and Pollution Agency), in collaboration with NILU (Norwegian Institute for 
Air Research) and UNIS (University Centre in Svalbard), on historical weather 
observations provided by MET (Norwegian Meteorological Institute), on the report 
on climate change in the Norwegian Arctic, freshly made public by NPI (Norwegian 
Polar Institute 2011), and on statistics issued by SSB (Statistics Norway).  
Fundamental to the contextualization of this research has also been my extensive 
stay in situ1, as part of a long experience in the Arctic, which gave me the unique 
opportunity to discuss my ideas with scientists and researchers from different parts 
of the world. The interaction with inhabitants of Longyearbyen also proved itself 
useful, especially in considering their present degree of dependence on the coal 
industry. 
Although a minute scientific analysis is beyond the ambition of this short 
report, I will try to argue why it is environmentally advantageous and politically conceivable to 
assume the existence of a Norwegian stable settlement on Svalbard, even in the absence of the local 
coal enterprise. In the second part of the paper, I will argue about the current and future 
potential of renewable sources (wind and PV) to replace the town coal-based power plant. A 
preliminary assessment of the estimated investment, of the social, political, technical 
and environmental challenges to overcome and of the possible visual impact, will 
also be included in my exploratory scenario. 
 
2. Historical overview 
 
In the last two centuries, Svalbard has been theatre of several „cold wars‟ 
between different countries (Norway, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, 
Holland, USA, Germany, France, Spain, Poland), that have silently fought each 
other, either for the monopoly on fishing and hunting, for the conquest of the North 
Pole, for the strategic area, for scientific reasons, or for the exploitation of mineral 
resources (Hoel 1925, Orheim 2006).  
In 1920, the negotiations after the end of the First World War were taken as 
an opportunity to establish order also in this „nobody‟s land‟. Norway, at that time a 
poor country, was then granted sovereignty on it, together with the absolute 
authority on rules for industrial operations and on safety and protection of the 
environment. Despite that, Oslo never felt the complete control of the region, 
mainly because, according to the obsolete (and to a certain extent, unsustainable) 
Treaty of Spitsbergen (1920), still valid today, citizens from signatory countries can 
                                                 




benefit from the same rights as Norwegians to engage in industrial activities as 
mining, fishing or hunting and to conduct scientific research.  
This circumstance is particularly evident in relation to the Russian claims on the area, 
historically considered a threat (Brown 2000), in so much as we have assisted to a 
case of “environmental colonialism” (Agarwal and Narain 1991:1, emphasis in the 
original), a continuous rush of Norway to exploit and occupy Svalbard, way more 
than any other signatory country. An onerous strategy, often economically arguable, 
but believed to be advantageous in case of future international resolutions (Orheim 
2006).  
No country is ready to give up. On one hand, despite an extremely low 
productivity (SSB 2005a:152), Russia unexplainably keeps running its mine in 
Barentsburg. On the other hand, Norway, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Gahr Støre (2006), declared to “have initiated a number of dialogues (…) with states 
that have an interest in the region”, but also made it clear that “there are some 
questions that are not up for discussion or negotiation. One of these is the question 
of Norway‟s continued jurisdiction in accordance with international law”. 
From a political perspective, the building of a strong Norwegian community, 
Longyearbyen, the strategic establishment of a campus (UNIS), the creation of a 
raising business around tourism and the extensive exploitation of mineral resources, 
make a lot of sense. 
What is less clear, though, is the systematic exploitation of mineral resources in such 
a fragile environment, as the magic formula to resolve a political puzzle.  
Robert Hermansen, the former managing director of the mining company 
(SNSK2), interviewed by Brown (2000:2), made it no secret: “To keep control of 
Svalbard we have to have a community here. If we left, the Russians would 
immediately claim it”. 
Yet, a careful reading of the Treaty (1920) and of the following acts3 reveals 
no connection between mining and sovereignty. On the contrary, Hermansen indirectly 
confirms that what‟s politically needed is only a stable settlement, not a polluting 
mine!  
In these terms it becomes quite complicated for Norway, an oil producer, to 
justify the subsidies given to the only coal industry of the country (Hoel 1925, WWF 
2001), which until 2001 was always in economic loss (Store Norske Spitsbergen 
Grubekompani AS 2004:6), and together with the Russian mine, was responsible in 
2007 for the emission of 52% of carbon dioxide (CO2), 99% of methane (CH4) and 
92% of sulphur dioxide (SO2), within the archipelago (KLIF 2009:16).  
The embarrassment grows even more if we consider the plan to boost the 
production and open a new mine in 2013 (SNSK 2011a), an act that alone admits the 
                                                 
2 Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani (SNSK) is the northernmost coal industry in the world. Established 
in 1916, it currently operates in two coal mines on Svalbard: Gruve 7, just outside Longyearbyen, and Svea 
Nord (Sveagruva), about 60 Km South of the capital. A new mine, located in Lunckefjell, is scheduled to 
start its operations in winter 2013 (SNSK 2011a).  
3 To the Treaty of Spitsbergen (1920), which recognized Norwegian sovereignty and included regulations on 
taxation, environmental conservation, non-discrimination and military restrictions, followed four acts: the 
Svalbard Act (1925), which made the archipelago officially part of Norway; the Mining Code (1925), on the 
exploitation of mineral resources over the archipelago; the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act (2001), 
that introduced strict laws on the protection of flora, fauna and large areas; the Boundary Treaty (2010), 
signed by Norway and Russia, on the marine boundaries between Svalbard and Novaya Zemlya (Royal 
Ministry of Justice 1988, Regjeringen 2001, Kramer 2010). 
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failure of the much advertised goal, declared in the Norwegian parliament in 1995, to 
make Svalbard “one of the best-managed wilderness areas in the world” 
(Guðmundsdóttir and Sæþórsdóttir 2009:2).  
 
3. A Contradictory Climate Policy 
 
When the UN World Commission on Environment and Development, 
chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, published its report, Our Common Future, and 
recognized climate change as a main issue for sustainable development (WCED 
1987), Norway saw itself as “a natural leader in international environmental policy” 
(Hovden and Lindseth 2002:146). Its commitment in the stimulation of the 
„Montreal Protocol‟ (NPI 2011), in the contribution to Agenda 21 (UNCED 1993), in 
the promotion of flexible mechanisms before the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
(Hovden and Lindseth 2002, Torvanger et al. 2004), and even in the failed try to find 
a common agreement in Copenhagen (WBGU 2010), seems to demonstrate the 
same.  
According to Hovden and Lindseth, though, the Norwegian position on the 
issue of climate change, must be accounted: 
 
As a product of two important considerations for any Norwegian 
government: the need to maintain credibility nationally and internationally 
as an environmental pioneer, and the fact that Norway, as a leading 
petroleum exporter is heavily dependent on income from its considerable 
oil and gas exports (2002:146). 
 
Norway is today the world‟s sixth largest exporter of oil (EIA 2010:2), and 
the second largest supplier of natural gas to the European Union (2010:4). These 
data still do not collide with the environmental leadership, especially if we consider 
the possibility for industrialized countries to achieve the targets ratified in Kyoto, 
concerning the reduction and stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere, “by action abroad, rather than at home” (Woodhouse 2000:143).  
What is more surprising, instead, is the contradictory way of Norway to 
justify its oil business as a product “less pollution intensive than fossil alternatives 
such as coal” (Hanisch4 1990, cited in Hovden and Lindseth 2002:150), and its gas 
exports as a greener option than “the much more polluting coal” (2002: 152).  
If coal is such an evil pollutant, and this argument is widely employed to 
defend the Norwegian trade around oil and gas, why is it still extracted on Svalbard? 
Is not the archipelago part of Norway? How worthy and necessary is it to run a 
polluting, often unprofitable industry, furthermore sole in the country, whose 
economic return is dependent on the fluctuations of an unstable market?  
To both the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority5 and the Stortinget (the 
Norwegian Parliament) goes the uncomfortable duty to provide answers to all these 
                                                 
4 Ted Hanisch, former director of CICERO (Center for International Climate and Environmental Research), 
in 1990 became part of the Norwegian delegation to the climate negotiations as an observer (Hovden and 
Lindseth 2002). 
5 The Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) “has the responsibility for controlling and licensing the 
Norwegian and Russian coal industry and the energy production from the coal power plants in Longyearbyen 




questions, in addition to the ethical responsibility of implementing a more coherent 
international climate policy. 
 
4. Environmental Degradation: A Way Out 
 
In the last century, the temperature in the Arctic has increased twice as 
quickly as the world‟s average (IPCC 2007). According to NPI (2011:8), the mean 
annual temperature on north-east of Svalbard, compared to the current, may even 
increase of 8°C by the end of this century, a scenario that would certainly induce 
dramatic ecological consequences at a local and global level.  
By reflecting back to space the received solar energy (albedo effect), light 
surfaces like snow, glaciers and sea ice, act “like a mirror” (KLIF 2009:10). Their 
melting on Svalbard, already in place, is not only causing sea level to raise, a shorter 
winter season and the release into the atmosphere of huge quantities of previously 
trapped GHG as methane (CH4) or carbon dioxide (CO2) (NPI 2011), but also more 
absorption of solar radiation, which is accelerating even more the ongoing process of 
global warming (Borroughs 2007). 
As a result, also the biological diversity on the archipelago is in danger: 
 
Several species are dependent on sea ice, such as ice algae that grow in and 
under the ice, seals that need sea ice to give birth to their young, polar 
bears6 that prey on seals, and several species of seabirds, as many aspects of 
their lifecycle are associated with sea ice (NPI 2011:11). 
 
Although climate change in the Norwegian Arctic is mainly caused by GHG 
emissions in other areas of the world, local pollutants can also visibly affect the 
surrounding ecosystem (NPI 2011). A recent study of the University of Science and 
Technology of Trondheim, for example, has demonstrated how the problem of acid 
mine drainage in Bjørndalen (Svalbard), caused by “degradation of sulphide minerals 
in presence of water and oxygen” (Holm et al. 2003:1), is persistent in creating 
“damage to the local tundra vegetation” (ibidem), despite the fact that the mine has 
been closed down since 1996.  
Among the scientific community, there is very little doubt that the main local 
contributors to Svalbard‟s climate change are the substantial emissions of carbon 
dioxide, methane, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, black carbon (soot), and organic 
carbon. These are all GHG and pollutants directly connected with the energy 
production in the coal-based power plant and with the operations of extraction, 
transportation and shipping of coal (KLIF 2009:15-16). 
Yet, data on the total emission of CO2 within the archipelago in 2007, 
surprisingly account for only 1% of the carbon dioxide emitted from the mainland in 
the same year (2009:15). This is a very small number, as seen in these terms. If, 
instead, we espouse the more sustainable sharing theory of per-capita emissions, 
supported by Agarwal and Narain (1991) and Wilhite and Norgard (2004), then we 
                                                 
6 A study commissioned by the US Government, has shown how long-distance swimming for a female polar 
bear in Arctic waters, in a year of extreme sea ice retreat, “may result in high energetic costs and compromise 
reproductive fitness” (Durner et al. 2011:1). 
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realise how intolerable the current situation on Svalbard is7. Here the per-capita 
emission of CO2 in 2007 is 181 tons, 3 times more than that of a citizen of Qatar, the 
country with the highest per-capita emission in the world (55.4 tons); 20 times more 
than a Norwegian living on the mainland (9.1 tons); 36 times more than a Chinese (5 
tons), and 129 times more than an Indian (1.4 tons) (World Bank 2007).  
Despite the reassurance of the mine company on the priority given to safety, 
so to make sure that as a result of its operations “no humans or wildlife become sick or 
injured nor the natural environment damaged” (SNSK 2011b, emphasis added), the 
environmental impact of the coal enterprise on the local ecosystem is no longer 
disputable and, as mentioned above, proved by different scientific studies (Holm et 
al. 2003, KLIF 2009, NPI 2011). All of them confirm that today‟s local emission 
rates “will continue to increase in the future unless additional measures are taken” 
(KLIF 2009:39).  
I argue that such a serious environmental alarm already constitutes a 
sufficient argument to justify a forced closedown of the Norwegian mines on 
Svalbard, a possibility that is also politically feasible, since, as demonstrated above, it 
would not undermine the sovereign rights of Norway on the region (Treaty of 
Spitsbergen 1920).  
How would such a decision affect life in the Norwegian settlements of 
Sveagruva and Longyearbyen?  
A scenario in which Gruve 7 and Svea Nord are closed, is likely to cause the 
complete abandoning of Sveagruva, as already happened in Pyramiden in 1998, an 
effect of Russia‟s decision to closedown the local mine (Orheim 2006).  
More complex, instead, appears the analysis of potential repercussions in 
Longyearbyen, where, since the early 1990s, “there have been major changes in 
working life” (SSB 2009:12). Although mining and construction, with 387 persons 
employed (SSB 2010b:383), are still the largest endeavours in terms of occupation 
(26%)8, “all private-sector service industries have more than doubled their 
employment in the period 1993-2007” (SSB 2009:12), with particular reference to the 
fields of tourism, research and education (Guðmundsdóttir and Sæþórsdóttir 2009, 
SSB 2009). 
Despite a large scepticism noticed among the inhabitants9, the trend 
underlined by SSB statistics is very useful in considering their current degree of 
dependence on coal. Data suggests that a permanent community would probably 
survive anyway to a closedown of the mines. The other industrial sectors, in fact, 
appear mature and strong enough to manage the loss of direct and indirect business 
provided by the coal enterprise in town and to absorb a number of unemployed 
individuals, for instance, in the fast-growing tourist industry.  
In a scenario without mines, though, the replacement of coal in the local 
power plant becomes a vital, as well as an ethical, issue to solve. Bearing in mind that 
“things which are easy today because of the availability of suitable fossil fuels (…) will not be easy 
in the future” (Ferguson 2008:137, emphasis in the original), the recourse to renewable 
energy seems the only viable alternative.  
                                                 
7 On 01/01/2007 Svalbard’s total population was of 2,338 inhabitants (SSB 2010a:1). 
8 Calculated in relation to 1,495 persons (adult population employed in 2009) (SSB 2010c:1). 
9 The perspective of closedown of the mines appears unrealistic to most of the inhabitants, mainly for 














6.01 5.97 5.0 4.84 4.3 4.28 4.29 3.79 4.22 4.98 5.67 5.83 
 
Table 1: Monthly wind speed average, observed at Svalbard Airport (4.8 Km North-
West of Longyearbyen) in the period 2001-2010. Unit: m/s (NMI 2011:FFM). 
 
The entire second part of this report, thus, will concern a preliminary analysis 
of the potential adoption of photovoltaic (PV) and on-shore wind power, as 
complementary substitutes of coal in meeting Longyearbyen‟s energy demand.  
 
5. The Present and Future Potential of Renewable Energy 
in Longyearbyen: An Exploratory Scenario 
 
Svalbard‟s abundance of wind and sun constitute the basis of the following 
exploratory scenario. Through the use of literature and statistics, I seek for ideal 
conditions and numerical evidence to prove the benefit of investments into the field 
of renewable energy in Longyearbyen. 
 
5.1. Designing a wind park.  
On a global scale, wind is the result of “uneven heating of the Earth‟s surface 
combined with the rotation of the planet” (Dahl 2004a:3). At Svalbard this condition 
is stressed even more by the warm Gulf Stream that hits the stiff shore. The colder 
the coast, the stronger the winds generated. It is mainly for this reason that the 
windiest months of the year in Longyearbyen are those who present a lower solar 
irradiation (Table 1).  
According to Dahl, in order to assess whether the wind can be considered a 
reliable option for any Polar renewable energy project, a given site must present 
“average wind speeds of greater than 4 m/s” (2004a:6). This is because wind 
velocity, due to its cubed expression, is extremely decisive in the output formula of a 
turbine: 
P = 1/2 ρ A V 3 
Where P is the available power from the wind (measured in Watt), ρ the air density 
(Kg/m3), A the swept area of the rotor (m2), and V the wind speed (m/s).  
An increase of any of these factors, in particular V, will lead to a considerable 
expansion of the final power output (Ngô and Natowitz 2009). The need to find the 
windiest location possible, then, is of crucial importance in the design-stage of a 
wind park.  
Although the only official data available (Table 1) already show that all 
months of the year, apart from August, appear perfect to the development of a wind 
farm just outside Longyearbyen, there is still room for improvement, for example, by 

















7.81 7.76 6.5 6.29 5.59 5.56 5.58 4.93 5.49 6.47 7.37 7.58 
 
Table 2: Monthly wind speed average assumed to be found on top of Platåberget, 
calculated by rising of 30% the data in Table 1. Unit: m/s (Seifried and Witzel 
2010:102). 
 
Since the observations have been made near the airport, at an altitude of only 
28 m (NMI 2011), and considering that wind velocities are generally 30% higher at 
peaks (Seifried and Witzel 2010:102), it would be much more convenient to place 
wind turbines on top of a hill. Thus, with the help of a topographical map (Annex 1), 
we may locate a perfect site, for instance, on top of Platåberget (450 m), between the 
airport and town.  
From a morphological point of view, this plateau, with its flat and large clear 
area, seems ideal for hosting big turbines. At the same time, it presents the 
remarkable advantage of being very close to the grid of the settlement. 
Following Seifried and Witzel, then, we can presume to meet the monthly 
average velocities on top of Platåberget, specified in Table 2. 
As a result of such a small change in location, we are now expected to meet 
suitable conditions for the design of a wind park even in August. In addition to that, 
the annual wind speed average increased from 4.93 m/s to about 6.5 m/s, a 
significant difference in terms of power output. 
Once located the site, the next step is to select the right type of wind turbine, 
in relation to the environmental conditions and to the energy demand (Dahl 2004a). 
The most recent statistics available10, relative to the year 2003, quantify in 68 GWh 
the annual consumption of electricity in Longyearbyen (SSB 2005b:158), a number 
partially explainable by the harsh weather conditions that force households and 
offices to keep their heating systems on, all year long. To cope with such a hostile 
weather, the choice of the most resistant, efficient and technologically advanced 
turbine on the market, is advisable.  
Let us take, for example, the new Gamesa G97 (Gamesa 2011), a medium-sized 
turbine with a capacity rate of 2 MW that, in relation to our wind data (average wind 
speed of 6.5 m/s and a supposed air density of 1.225 Kg/m3), promises to release 
about 760 W of instantaneous power (Gamesa 2011:8).  
Assuming a capacity factor of 40% (3500 h/year), “the percentage of its 
nameplate capacity that a turbine installed in a particular location will deliver over the 
course of a year” (EWEA 2009:445), a level of efficiency very common in new-
generation turbines (Dahl 2004a), we are now able to calculate the expected annual 
power output of a single G97 placed on top of Platåberget: 
 
760 * 3500 = 2.66 GWh 
 
                                                 
10 The total consumption (68 GWh) also includes the electricity used in mining activities in both Gruve 7 and 
Svea, quantified in 7 GWh. I have decided not to deduct this term from the total, in order to balance the 
increase in consumption, which is likely to have occurred in Longyearbyen in the years following the 




To hypothesize the number of turbines of this kind needed to meet Longyearbyen‟s 
energy demand it is sufficient to divide the annual consumption of electricity by the 
expected output of a single turbine: 
 
68 / 2.66 ≈ 25 turbines G97-2MW 
 
This preliminary assessment, whose demanding investment would add up to € 
80,000,000 (Viva Energie 2011, private correspondence), due to lack of precise data 
from the chosen location, does not claim to be scientifically accurate. What is 
important, instead, is only to identify the potential of a still unexploited renewable 
resource.  
Yet, developing wind energy on Svalbard, might be a demanding task. A 
series of technological, environmental, financial and social challenges still need to be 
addressed.  
First of all, it is very difficult to make a heavy turbine stand upon the unstable 
thawing permafrost. The rise in temperature, caused by climate change, heavily 
affects permafrost by bringing changes in its form and consistency over time (NPI 
2011:36). To master this problem and stand above the surface, houses and research 
stations in Polar Regions have adopted elevated, adjustable foundations (Dahl 2010). 
Would it be possible to implement the same kind of system on weighty wind towers?  
Another big issue related to permafrost is the storage of power. Even in 
Longyearbyen, despite a certain constancy, the wind does not blow with the same 
force all year long. Historical observations highlight days of absolute calm (on 
average 10-11 days/year), and prolonged windy periods, with gusts that exceed 35 
m/s (NMI 2011). On such days, in normal conditions, there would exist different 
ways to store considerable amounts of electricity. Pumped storage plants and 
compressed air energy storage, for example, are systems able to make the 
overproduced power available in periods of low production (Seifried and Witzel 
2010:156).  
Yet, in Longyearbyen, due to the impenetrability of permafrost, these 
systems cannot be used. How to store the exceeding energy then? Is it conceivable an outdoor 
storage system? 
Solutions to these and other similar engineering matters have already been 
found on a small scale, where renewable technologies (wind-powered turbines, 
photovoltaic panels and solar thermal collectors), together with ingenious storage 
systems, allow citizens and researchers in Polar Regions to reduce environmental and 
financial costs, operating with zero-emission approaches.  
Remote examples as the city of Kotzebue in Alaska (CADDET 2001), or the 
research centres of Summit Station in Greenland (Dahl 2010), and Princess Elisabeth 
Station in Antarctica (Polar Power 2011), have the realistic potential to develop 
useful applications in places like Longyearbyen, where issues of the same kind are 
required to be solved on a larger scale.  
Other concerns, though, in addition to technical and logistic ones, might also 
prevent investors from running smoothly a wind project at Svalbard. 
Wind turbines, for instance, have a very short service life, generally between 4 to 10 
years (Dahl 2004a:7), require continuous maintenance and are not exempt from 
bringing environmental and social threats. Will the investment be able to pay-off in the long 
run? Will local people refer to the visual changes in landscape as “fascinating symbols of progress” 
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(Seifried and Witzel 2010:100, emphasis added), or will they think in terms of 
environmental degradation and noise pollution (Lorinc 2011)? And again: Could a wind park 
be dangerous for local wildlife, in particular for rare, migrating species of birds directed to the 
protected sanctuaries in the north of the archipelago (Pimentel 2008:5)? 
The impression is that we will not be able to produce any detailed and 
rigorous scenario on the implementation of wind turbines in Longyearbyen, until we 
provide reliable answers to all these questions. For that to happen, though, it is 
essential to sustain scientific research, develop small-scale examples and make them 
available to larger communities as Longyearbyen. 
 
5.2. PV: A Ready-made Solution.  
 
Since the issues connected with the exploitation of wind power on Svalbard 
still need time to be overcome, the direction of our attentions to other renewable 
resources like sun, capable of stemming GHG emissions right from the beginning, is 
fundamental.  
Although solar energy in Longyearbyen, in terms of significant power output, 
is available only for four-five months a year (from April to August), the almost 
nonexistent cloud coverage, scarce level of precipitations (NMI 2011), low 
temperatures (NSIDC 2011), and land availability, make me think that the 
archipelago is a perfect place for the implementation of mono-crystalline PV panels. 
The efficiency of this kind of solar cells, proved around 14-17% in Polar applications 
(Dahl 2004b:2, Seifried and Witzel 2010:52), is the highest on the market. It means 
that on a cloudless summer day, when at solar noon about 1,000 W/m2 hit PV 
panels placed perpendicular to the sun (Dahl 2004b:11), the output converted into 
electrical power will be of 140-170 W/m2.  
The promotion of energy generated from PV is already a feasible project in 
Longyearbyen. Unlike wind turbines, in fact, this silent, durable and fully recyclable 
technology (Seifried and Witzel 2010:54), does not require storage, transportation, 
special maintenance or additional research to be installed at Polar latitudes.  
A PV project might be carried out either in a big plant outside the settlement 
or, alternatively, on the roofs of houses and offices in town. 
Despite the benefits related to the higher power output, the first option, as for the 
design of a wind park, could end up looking like an „environmental monster‟ for 
someone.  
The visual impact, yet, might not be the only shortcoming. The very “low 
energy density” (2010:26) of solar panels, together with the limited access to solar 
resource, would constrain to maximise the production in the 127 days of perpetual 
daylight (NMI 2011). In order to do that, the requirement of an automated tracking 
system, capable of orienting the panels always perpendicularly to the sun, could be a 
demanding technology to build in such a windy location (Dahl 2004b:11, NSIDC 
2011). 
Much easier and free of drawbacks, instead, would be the installation of PV 
on the roofs of the houses. In such a scenario, strongly dependent on the willingness 
of the inhabitants to accept the new technology, households provided with grid-





If all 816 households in Longyearbyen (SSB 2005c:54) accepted it on their 
roofs, a drastic reduction in consumption of coal-based electricity and a drop of local 
GHG emissions is likely to be expected in summer. 
The quality of PV projects in Polar environments has already been tested. 
Summit Station in Greenland (Dahl 2010), and most of the research stations in 
Antarctica, for example, use photovoltaic panels as a complementary source of wind 
turbines to enhance reliability in less windy or dark periods. Together, these 
renewable technologies feed common battery banks in so called “hybrid systems” 




Demonstrating that the local extraction, transportation, shipping and burning 
of coal are responsible of worsening the ongoing effects of global climate change on 
Svalbard (Holm et al. 2003, KLIF 2009, NPI 2011), in this paper I have argued the 
urgent need to closedown such activities to respect the amenity of Svalbard‟s 
environment.  
A decision like that, though, is very likely to cause the loss of a considerable number 
of jobs, hence the depopulation of Longyearbyen and the consequent political risk 
for Norway to lose sovereignty of the archipelago. To get around these threats and 
incentive an alternative option to the coal-based power plant, I have proposed large 
investments into the field of renewable energy.  
My exploratory report has highlighted big untapped resources of wind and sun 
on Svalbard, reciprocal assets that, if implemented in a hybrid, grid-connected wind-
PV system, might have the potential to free the town from its energy dependence on 
a polluting and finite fossil reserve11.  
At the moment, PV is the only practicable renewable technology on Svalbard, 
although only for a few months a year. Even if alone it will hardly reach the same 
potential of wind to meet Longyearbyen‟s energy demand, it can still play an 
important role in terms of immediate reduction of local GHG emissions. Thus, I 
argue the need to prioritise its diffusion as soon as possible.  
Of course, a new climate strategy, more focused on investments in research 
and development of small-scale renewable solutions, would be required to complete 
the process. Such a policy should support the local community of Longyearbyen in 
particular, whose involvement and conviction in the overall project could prove 
essential to its final success (Adams and Hulme 2001, WBGU 2010). 
According to Torvanger et al. (2004:13), if achieved, “early actions” have the 
power to bring relevant environmental, political and economic effects. 
Considering the environmental impact first, a reduction of local GHG emissions may 
slow down Svalbard‟s ecological degradation, buying precious “time for humans and 
other species to adapt to climate change” (Ibid.).  
Political measures (i.e. economic incentives to households who provide their 
roofs with PV panels), in addition to implement a more coherent Norwegian climate 
policy, might bring the loss of the world record of CO2 per-capita emission, which 
                                                 
11 With the current extraction even at 2.5 million tons/yr, coal reserves will allow operations for only 25 more 
years (KLIF 2009:39). 
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cannot be considered a good image for a country that sees itself as a leader in the 
fight against global warming (Hovden and Lindseth 2002). 
Lastly, the whole local economy may take advantage of a huge renewable project. 
Lower bills for households, new job opportunities, new markets for industrial 
sectors, an impulse to research, innovation and technology and huge savings in 
energy consumption12 would be just some of the possible positive effects.  
If we agree not to compromise even more of Svalbard‟s environmental ability 
“to meet present and future needs” (WCED 1987:43), there is no other way than to 
bring green energy to Longyearbyen and to make it a reality.  
Keeping alive the local tradition connected with coal seems neither 
environmentally, nor economically sustainable.  
How paradoxical, though, that making the political decision to break such a 
„black tradition‟, appears today harder than to overcome scientific obstacles to the 
implementation of a wind park. But, after all, this is only one of the many 
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